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INSURANCE

W. Shelby McKenzie*
PERMISSIVE USE-SECOND PERMIrTTEE

Coverage under automobile liability policies is generally extended
not only to the named insured, but also to other persons using the vehicle
with the permission of the named insured.' Permission is a frequently
litigated issue in cases where the operator involved in the accident obtained possession of the automobile from a permissive user rather than
directly from the named insured. 2 The Louisiana Supreme Court first
considered coverage for a second permittee in Rogillo v. Cazedessus.'
The court recognized that under the policy language the permission necessary to effectuate coverage must flow from the named insured to the
operator. Permission from the first permittee is not sufficient unless the
first permittee has express or implied authority from the named insured to
allow others to drive. In Rogillo, the named insured's son gave the keys to
the unlicensed operator who was involved in the accident. The court held
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. For example, a family automobile policy usually provides that an insured
with respect to the owned automobile includes "any other person using such
automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation
or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such
permission."
2. Permission can also be an issue where the operator received or took
possession of the auto from the named insured. Under policy language which did
not expressly limit the coverage to use within the scope of the permission granted
by the named insured, our courts adopted the "initial permission rule." See, e.g.,
Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d 746 (1949); Parks v. Hall, 189
La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938). Simply stated, this rule holds that coverage exists if the
named insured gives express or implied permission for use in the first instance, and
coverage is not vitiated by any subsequent deviation from the scope of permission
by the permittee. About 1963, insurers began issuing policies which revised the
coverage language as set forth in note 1, supra, in an apparent attempt to write out
the initial permission rule by restricting coverage to operation within the scope of
permission. There has been surprisingly little recognition of this significant policy
revision in the Louisiana jurisprudence. Perhaps as a result of poor presentation of
issues by counsel, most courts have continued to apply the initial permission rule
without discussing the revised language.
3. 241 La. 186, 127 So. 2d 734 (1961); see Comment, "Omnibus Clause"-Problems in Louisiana Jurisprudence, 22 LA. L. REV. 626 (1962).
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there was neither express nor implied permission flowing from the named
insured to the operator.
Following Rogillo, the courts of appeal developed rather liberal
standards for finding implied permission. Where the named insured gave
general dominion over the automobile to the first permittee, the courts
held that the first permittee had the implied authority of the named insured
to grant permission to others to use the vehicle, unless such authority was
expressly and specifically restricted. The courts were willing to find
implied permission even in the face of a specific prohibition if there were
prior known but unprotested violations of the prohibition or other evidence
of the erosion of the prohibition.'
However, when the supreme court again considered the permission
issue in American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki,' a more restrictive
approach was adopted. In Czarniecki, the named insured, without imposing any express restrictions, entrusted his automobile to the first permittee
for use on a double date. Subsequently the first permittee allowed the
defendant operator with whom he was double dating to use the automobile
to take his date home and return to the party where the first permittee
remained. The court expressed the opinion that allowing another to use the
automobile was a substantial deviation from the permission granted the
first permittee for which there was no express or implied authority flowing
from the named insured.6
In two cases decided during the current term, the supreme court has
reconsidered this issue with decisions which point toward a reversion to
the more liberal approach. In Hughes v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance
Co. ,I the named insured and Cate had an established practice of exchanging vehicles for their own convenience. While the named insured was
using Cate's vehicle, Cate took the named insured's automobile on a tour
of local night spots with several friends. During the evening, Cate allowed
Andrews to drive the automobile while Cate remained in the automobile as
a passenger. They were involved in a serious accident while Andrews was
driving. Relying on Czarniecki, the court of appeal held that there was no
coverage for Andrews because there was no express or implied permission
4. E.g., Peterson v. Armstrong, 176 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
178 So. 2d 658 (1965); Coco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 288 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961), writ denied, Feb. 21, 1962.
5. 255 La. 251, 230 So. 2d 253 (1970).
6. The court quoted and seemed to place reliance on the revised policy
language limiting coverage to the scope of permission. 255 La. at 267, 230 So. 2d at
258-59.
7. 340 So. 2d 293 (La. 1976).
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from the named insured for his operation. The supreme court reversed,
finding that implied permission flowed from the customary practice of
exchanging vehicles without any express restrictions and from the fact that
the first permittee remained an occupant of the vehicle. Czarniecki was
distinguished as a first time loan from which such general authority could
not be implied. A concurring opinion suggested that judicial reconstruction after the accident of the implied terms of the permission granted by
the named insured should not be used to deprive injured parties of insurance protection.
In Morgan v. Matlack, Inc. ,8 suit against the insurer had been
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The evidence indicated that
the named insured had generally admonished his children against lending
the family car to others except "in emergencies and when circumstances
warranted that they had to." Finding a genuine issue of material fact, the
supreme court reversed and remanded with the observation that when the
named insured grants discretionary authority to lend under non-specific
circumstances, "he cannot thereafter complain when the discretion is
9
exercised and a second permittee is allowed to use the vehicle."
The liberalization of approach appears to be warranted by the manner
in which automobiles are frequently used in modern society. The named
insured, as the premium payer, ought and does by the policy language
have the right to decide who may use the automobile with the protection of
the liability coverage. However, it should be recognized that persons,
particularly young people using the family automobile, frequently allow
others to drive without giving serious thought to permission and insurance
coverage. Recognition of this common practice should impose upon
named insureds the duty to be specific with respect to any limitations on
the scope of the permission granted. Otherwise, permission should be
implied if it can be said that a reasonable named insured would have
consented to the use of the vehicle had he been present at the time the
decision to entrust the vehicle to the operator was made. In the absence of
an express prohibition, permission should be implied unless the vehicle
was entrusted to an unlicensed driver or an intoxicated person, for some
dangerous or outrageous purpose, or under other circumstances clearly
indicating that no reasonable named insured would have consented to such
0

use. 1

8. 342 So. 2d 167 (La. 1977).
9. Id.at 169.
10. A similar approach is suggested for limitations on the scope of permission
under the revised policy language. The initial or subsequent permittee should not
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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

In Seaton v. Kelly," the Louisiana Supreme Court placed the first
restraint on the expanding concept of stacking multiple uninsured motorist
coverages since holding policy restrictions against stacking invalid in the
Deane' 2 and Graham'I cases. In the 1975 case of Barbin v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. ,14 the supreme court approved the stacking of
coverages for multiple vehicles insured under the same policy not only for
persons expressly insured under the policy, but also for passengers insured
"while occupying an insured automobile," holding under a strained
interpretation of the policy that occupancy of any insured vehicle activated
coverage for all vehicles.' 5 Seaton was factually similar to Barbin with
the exception that the multiple vehicles were insured under separate
policies issued by the same insurer. The court held that a passenger was
entitled to recover only under the policy on the vehicle he was occupying
at the time of the accident. He was not insured under separate policies on
other vehicles owned by the same owner. 16 Seaton is correct, but it
emphasized the anomaly of the stacking concept which depended in this

instance upon whether the insurance company prefers to insure separate
have coverage for operation or use outside the scope of permission granted by the
named insured, but any limitation on the scope of permission should be either
express or clearly implied. Also, policies providing protection for insureds while
using non-owned automobiles usually restrict coverage to situations where the
actual operation or use by the insured is "with the permission, or reasonably
believed to be with the permission, of the owner and is within the scope of such
permission." In Czarniecki the court held that the second permittee likewise had no
reasonable belief that he had the permission of the owner to use the auto. With
respect to privately owned vehicles, it is suggested that an insured can reasonably
believe the person in possession of the automobile has the authority of the owner to
permit others to drive under reasonable circumstances unless he has notice of a
restriction on that authority. However, in the absence of additional facts a reasonable belief probably would not exist with respect to commercial or publicly

owned vehicles, since use is generally restricted for such vehicles.
11. 339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976).
12. Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 669 (1972).
13. Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972).
14. 315 So. 2d 754 (La. 1975); see discussion in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Insurance, 37 LA. L. REV. 494 (1977).
15. In family automobile policies, there usually are no "occupancy" limitations
for the named insured and any relative as defined in the policy.
16. This decision apparently does no violence to decisions following Deane and
Graham which have permitted stacking by persons expressly insured under two or
more policies who are injured while occupying one of the insured automobiles
notwithstanding policy language to the contrary. See, e.g., Crenwelge v. State
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vehicles under separate policies or to issue one policy applicable to
multiple vehicles. The judicially created stacking concept, which had
outlived its usefulness in light of recent legislation permitting the purchase
of increased uninsured motorist limits, has been wisely restricted by Act
623 of 1977.17
In 1972, the legislature extended the applicability of uninsured
motorist coverage to include losses caused by "underinsured" motorists.' 8 Subsequent amendments broadened the definition of an uninsured
motor vehicle "to include an insured motor vehicle when the automobile
liability insurance coverage on such vehicle is less than the amount of
damages suffered by an insured.' 9 In Guillot v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.,20 the plaintiff was injured as a result of the negligence of her
husband. The automobile in which they were riding was insured under a
policy providing both liability and uninsured motorist coverages. Finding
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). In Seaton, the
court expressly noted that "if a plaintiff is an insured under two or more policies or
one policy covering two or more automobiles, pays premiums or has premiums paid
for his benefit for two or more different uninsured motorist coverages, he can
cumulate the coverages." 339 So. 2d at 734.
17. 1977 La. Acts, No. 623, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406 (Supp. 1976) provides
in part:
(c) If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of
automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of subsection D(l),
then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor
vehicles covered under said policy of insurance and such limits of uninsured
motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance
available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or
policy; provided, however, that with respect to other insurance available, the
policy of insurance or endorsement shall provide the following:
With respect to bodily injury to an injured party while occupying an automobile
not owned by said injured party, the following priorities of recovery under
uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:
(i) the uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the injured
party was an occupant is primary;
(ii) should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to
the extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as
excess from other uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In
no instance shall more than one coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be available as excess over and above the
primary coverage available to the injured occupant.

See the discussion of Act 623 in The Work of the LouisianaLegislaturefor the 1976
Regular Session-Insurance, 38 LA. L. REV. 128 (1977).
18. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b) (1950), as amended by 1972 La. Acts, No. 137.
19. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(b) (1950), as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 154.

20. 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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that the bodily injury damages sustained by the plaintiff exceeded the
liability limits of the policy, the court awarded plaintiff recovery of the
excess under the uninsured motorist coverage of the same policy, holding
the policy exclusion which would have prevented such recovery in conflict
with the uninsured motorist coverage statute. 21 This holding seems consistent with the obvious legislative purpose of making uninsured motorist
coverage available to injured persons for whom liability coverages are
inadequate.
Ordinarily, the person claiming uninsured motorist coverage has the
burden of proving that the negligent driver was uninsured or underinsured.
However, for a situation where such proof is not possible, most policies
contain an extension of coverage for a "hit and run vehicle" as defined in
the policy. Hensley v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 22 reaffirmed
the validity of the policy requirement of physical contact with the hit-andrun vehicle in denying coverage to a plaintiff who allegedly collided with a
23
vehicle as a result of the negligence of a third, unidentified vehicle.
Although the negligent motorist did not stop at the accident scene, the
plaintiff in Arceneaux v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. 24 was denied coverage
because the plaintiff could have identified the hit-and-run vehicle with
reasonable diligence from evidence, including the license number, readily
available to him from the police report. On the other hand, in Kinchen v.
Dixie Auto Insurance Co. ,25 the plaintiff was not denied coverage under
the hit and run provision, despite his failure to give notice within thirty
days of the accident as required by the policy. The court properly applied
the general rule recognized in Louisiana that breach of a notice provision
will not permit avoidance of coverage unless the insurer proves actual
prejudice resulting from the delay.
Soniat v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 26 was the first
Louisiana decision to award penalties and attorney's fees for failure to
make timely payment of an uninsured motorist claim. The claims under
uninsured motorist coverage are first party claims between an insured and
his own insurer which would be governed by the penalty provisions of
21. LA. R.S. 22:1406 (1950 & Supp. 1975). The Guillot decision may be inconsistent with Arado v. Central National InsuranceCo., 337 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976), but it is difficult to determine whether the court in Arado was applying
Louisiana law or the law of'the state in which the policy was issued.
22. 340 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
23. See also Collins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970).
24. 341 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
25. 343 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
26. 340 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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section 658 of the Insurance Code. However, they are a unique type of
claim in which the liability of the insurer is predicated upon the liability of
a third party and in which the fixing of the amount of the claim is difficult
because of the inexact science of measuring general damages for personal
injuries. Other courts have refused to award penalties and attorney's fees
for failure to pay uninsured motorist claims on the ground that the insurer
has no obligation to pay until the legal liability of the alleged uninsured
motorist is established, an issue to which the insurer has a right to a
judicial determination.27 Soniat involved unusual circumstances in which
the insurer conceded liability for the policy limits of its uninsured motorist
coverage, but refused to pay those limits unless and until the insured
released a liability claim against the driver of the insured vehicle. In view
of the unusual nature of an uninsured motorist claim, the penalty provision
should be applied, if at all, only in situations where the insurer has clearly
engaged in outrageous conduct to gain an economic advantage unrelated to
the good faith negotiation of the uninsured motorist claim alone.
27. See, e.g., Schoelen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 318 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975).

